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THE AD HOC FEDERAL CRIME OF
TERRORISM: WHY CONGRESS NEEDS TO
AMEND THE STATUTE TO ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS DOMESTIC EXTREMISM
NATHAN CARPENTER†
INTRODUCTION
On August 11, 2017, hundreds of white nationalists, carrying
torches and chanting racist epithets, violently engaged with
counter-protesters in Charlottesville, Virginia.1 The next day,
many of those same individuals marched throughout
Charlottesville and clashed with counter-demonstrators again.2
During this “extremist demonstration turned violent,” one
individual killed a counter-protester and injured nineteen others
by driving his vehicle into a crowd.3
On September 6, 2017, Congress issued Senate Joint
Resolution 49 (“Joint Resolution”), condemning the “racist
violence and domestic terror attack” that took place in
Charlottesville, expressing concern for similar extremism in
other cities and “the growing and open display of hate and
violence being perpetrated by [white nationalist] groups.”4 The
Joint Resolution also called on the Trump Administration to
curtail the threat posed by domestic extremist groups.5 Finally,
the Joint Resolution called on the Attorney General “to
investigate thoroughly all acts of violence, intimidation, and
domestic terrorism by White supremacists . . . and associated
groups[,] . . . to improve the reporting of hate crimes and to
emphasize the importance of the collection, and the
reporting . . . of hate crime data by State and local agencies.”6
†
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However, what many do not realize is that the act carried
out by the neo-Nazi sympathizer in Charlottesville does not
constitute terrorism under federal law.7 Terrorism is not an
explicit charge under federal law,8 but a specific act can
constitute the federal crime of terrorism if it is “intended to help
bring about, encourage, or contribute to” an offense specifically
listed in § 2332b(g)(5) (“the federal crime of terrorism statute”).9
These offenses include providing material support to terrorists,10
bombing public places,11 and various crimes relating to
government property, air travel, and naval equipment, among
other things.12 The act also must be “calculated to influence or
affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or
to retaliate against government conduct”13 in order to expose a
defendant to various investigatory and legal mechanisms meant
to deter such actions and prevent future harms.14 The alleged
7
The defendant was charged with second degree murder, three counts of
malicious wounding, and one count of hit and run. Id. None of these charges are
listed in acts that may constitute the federal crime of terrorism. See
18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) (West 2015).
8
Greg Myre, Why the Government Can’t Bring Terrorism Charges in
Charlottesville, NPR (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/14/543462676/
why-the-govt-cant-bring-terrorism-charges-in-charlottesville.
9
See United States v. Awan, 607 F.3d 306, 314 (2d Cir. 2010); see also United
States v. Fidse, 778 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the defendant must
have “one purpose of his substantive count of conviction or his relevant conduct the
intent to promote a federal crime of terrorism”) (citation omitted). An act must
transcend national boundaries in order to be charged under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b, but
an offense specified in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) does not have to transcend
boundaries for the investigatory and deterrence purposes discussed in this Note. See
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI
OPERATIONS 18 (2008) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES]; U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 cmt. n.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2002) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL].
10
18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (West 2015).
11
18 U.S.C. § 2332f (2012).
12
18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5).
13
United States v. Harris, 434 F.3d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)).
14
See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23. A federal crime of
terrorism charge allows for an enterprise investigation into “any relationship of the
group to a foreign power, its size and composition, its geographic dimensions and
finances, its past acts and goals, and its capacity for harm.” Id. at 18; see also
18 U.S.C. § 3286(b) (2012) (providing that there is no statute of limitations if a
federal crime of terrorism results in death); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(j) (West 2015)
(providing that there is also no limitation on the supervised release period of a
person convicted of a federal crime of terrorism). “If the offense is a felony that
involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism, increase by 12
levels; but if the resulting offense level is less than level 32, increase to level 32.”
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9, at § 3A1.4(a). “In each such case,
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murder in Charlottesville does not fall within any of the specific
crimes because the statute does not list murder or hate crimes as
acts that may constitute terrorism.15 This means that the event
will not trigger mechanisms available for terrorism-related cases.
This Note argues that Congress should add such crimes to
the list specified in the federal crime of terrorism statute and
amend the statute’s intent requirement. This will allow the
Department of Justice to more adequately use its resources to
address the growing prevalence of hate groups, increase
investigatory capabilities, and emphasize the threat posed by
such groups. Part I explores the current federal crime of
terrorism and analyzes how various terrorism-related cases are
adjudicated. Part II introduces the prevailing threat of political
extremists operating within the United States and shows that
they should no longer be placed in a separate legal framework.
Part III looks at state terrorism laws as a guideline for possible
changes to federal terrorism law. Finally, Part IV introduces
amendments to domestic terrorism statutes and addresses any
perceived issues with the recommended changes.
I.

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ARBITRARY
DISTINCTION

This section explores the legal framework surrounding
domestic terrorism and examines acts that fall within the federal
crime of terrorism and acts that do not. All of these acts are
outlawed by current federal law but not all of them elicit the
legal mechanisms that accompany a terrorism charge. Amending
the federal crime of terrorism to include murder and hate crimes
will allow all of these acts to be eligible for the terrorism
designation.
A.

Murder Is Not Enough To Bring a Crime Within the Legal
Terrorism Framework

The United States Code defines domestic terrorism as
“activities that involve acts dangerous to human life
that . . . appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government
the defendant's criminal history category from Chapter Four (Criminal History and
Criminal Livelihood) shall be Category VI.” Id. at § 3A1.4(b).
15
See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).
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by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping . . . .”16 This
definition was created to strengthen “surveillance powers and
government authority to conduct intelligence-gathering
operations in matters of suspected terrorism, as well as [to allow]
for the civil seizure of assets based only on probable cause, and
heightened punishments for any of the underlying crimes . . . .”17
A defendant cannot be charged with terrorism under federal
law.18 Instead, specific offenses when paired with the requisite
intent are designated to constitute the federal crime of terrorism
for sentencing and investigatory purposes.19 When a defendant
performs or attempts a federal crime of terrorism, the FBI
initiates an enterprise investigation that looks into possible coconspirators or groups with which the defendant may be
involved, as well as any capacity for future harm from the
defendant’s associates.20 If Congress expands the federal crime of
terrorism, the law will properly encompass crimes by domestic
extremists, such as the one in Charlottesville.
Currently, the only way that a wholly domestic extremist,
such as the alleged murderer in Charlottesville, can be subject to
the various investigatory and legal mechanisms provided by the
domestic terrorism framework is if he “intended to help bring
about, encourage, or contribute to a federal crime of terrorism as
that term is defined” by statute.21 This expands the statutory
definition slightly to include offenses such as obstructing an
investigation of a federal crime of terrorism22 and criminal
contempt,23 but if the defendant is convicted of an offense that is
not specifically enumerated in the statute, the district court
“must identify which enumerated federal crime of terrorism the
defendant intended to promote, satisfy the elements of [the
federal crime of terrorism statute], and support its conclusions by
a preponderance of the evidence with facts from the record.”24
The defendant’s conduct also must be found to be “calculated to
16

18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2012).
Sudha Setty, What's in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years
After 9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 23–24 (2011).
18
Myre, supra note 8.
19
See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9, at § 3A1.4.
20
See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9.
21
See United States v. Awan, 607 F.3d 306, 314 (2d Cir. 2010); see also United
States v. Fidse, 778 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2015).
22
See United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 311 (4th Cir. 2008).
23
See United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 825 (7th Cir. 2009).
24
Fidse, 778 F.3d at 481 (quoting United States v. Arnaout 431 F.3d 994, 1002
(7th Cir. 2005)).
17
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influence or affect the government’s conduct by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.”25 This
narrow definition leaves many violent acts by domestic
extremists outside of the federal terrorism framework.
Although violent crime rates in the United States have
dropped since the 1990s,26 there is no shortage of high profile
crimes covered by the national media and condemned by the
federal government.27 Some of these crimes are immediately
categorized as terrorism,28 while other similar crimes are never
given the designation.29 The current ad hoc approach to what can
and cannot constitute the federal crime of terrorism creates a
discrepancy that leaves many Americans wondering why certain
horrific events, with multiple casualties, are categorized as
terrorism while others are not.
B. Acts Considered Terrorism Under Current Law
The federal crime of terrorism encompasses the use of
explosives, attempts to recruit individuals to carry out acts in the
name of a foreign terrorist organization, and acting in accordance
with a doctrine of self-radicalization promoted by an extremist
group.30 The commission of a crime under the federal crime of
terrorism statute allows the FBI to engage in a special
investigation.31 The investigation examines the activity of the
group involved in order to determine “any relationship of the
group to a foreign power, its size and composition, its geographic
dimensions and finances, its past acts and goals, and its capacity

25

United States v. Harris, 434 F.3d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 2005).
John Gramlich, 5 Facts About Crime in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 30,
2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/30/5-facts-about-crime-in-theu-s/.
27
See Transcript and Video: President Trump Speaks About Charlottesville,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/politics/trans
cript-and-video-president-trump-speaks-about-charlottesville.html?_r=0; President
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering
Violent Extremism (Feb. 18, 2015) (transcript available at https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/remarks-president-closing-summitcountering-violent-extremism).
28
See President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation by the President (Dec. 6,
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/06/address-nat
ion-president.
29
See Transcript and Video: President Trump Speaks About Charlottesville,
supra note 27.
30
18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (West 2015).
31
See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9.
26
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for harm.”32 The investigation also determines “the identity and
relationship of its members, employees, or other persons who
may be acting in furtherance of its objectives.”33
An act can trigger these investigatory mechanisms when the
defendant chooses to use a specific method or weapon listed in
the federal crime of terrorism statute.34 On October 14, 2016, the
Department of Justice filed a criminal complaint against Curtis
Wayne Allen, Patrick Eugene Stein, and Gavin Wayne Wright,
alleging that the defendants conspired to use a weapon of mass
destruction.35 The defendants were members of an organization
known as the Crusaders, which has “anti-government, antiMuslim, and anti-immigrant extremist beliefs,” and were
planning an attack on a Muslim community in Kansas.36
Fortunately, authorities were able to apprehend these men
before they were able to carry out their attack. Use of a weapon
of mass destruction or conspiracy to do so is outlawed by federal
law and constitutes the federal crime of terrorism,37 so this
charge triggered investigatory mechanisms by the FBI allowing
the Crusaders to be investigated further.38 If the defendants
were not planning to use a bomb to carry out their attack, the
conduct would not have been considered a federal crime of
terrorism.
A terrorism-related charge can also apply if a defendant
attempts to recruit others to commit acts of terror.39 On August
17, 2016, Erick Jamal Hendricks was indicted on conspiracy to
provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization.40
The Government monitored Hendricks’ social media profiles and
used confidential informants to build a case against Hendricks.41
Using this evidence, the Government alleged that Hendricks “has
some connection to the attempted terrorist attack in Garland,
Texas on May 3, 2015 . . . [and] recruited other individuals to join
32

Id.
Id. at 23.
34
Id.
35
See Sealed Criminal Complaint, United States v. Allen, No. 16-M-6151-GEB
(D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2016).
36
Id.
37
18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (West 2015).
38
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23.
39
Id.
40
United States v. Hendricks, No. 1:16CR265, 2016 WL 4708631, at *1 (N.D.
Ohio Sept. 17, 2016); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)–(b) (West 2015); id.
§ 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i) (West 2015).
41
Hendricks, 2016 WL 4708631, at *3.
33
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together in coordinated terrorist attacks.”42 Hendricks claimed to
“have ten operatives in the United States and hoped to raid
military depots for weapons.”43
Hendricks also told FBI
informants that “he worked full-time as a recruiter.”44 Providing
material support to terrorists is a crime enumerated in the
federal crime of terrorism statute,45 so all of Hendricks’ contacts
and possible affiliates were likely investigated as well.
A crime can fall within the federal crime of terrorism if the
defendant is inspired by Islamic extremist groups.46 On October
31, 2017, Sayfullo Saipov allegedly killed eight people when he
drove a vehicle down a crowded bike path.47 The defendant told
law enforcement that “[h]e was inspired by 90 graphic and
violent propaganda videos found on his phone—in particular, one
in which [Islamic State] leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi asks what
Muslims are doing to avenge deaths in Iraq.”48 The defendant
was said to have “followed almost exactly to a ‘T’ [Islamic State]
instructions on how to carry out such an attack.”49 Since he was
charged with providing material support which constitutes the
federal crime of terrorism,50 the FBI will investigate whether
Saipov was connected to any groups or individuals that may be
planning similar attacks or attempting to radicalize other
individuals. If the defendant was motivated by the neo-Nazi
ideology of a domestic extremist group, like the alleged murderer
in Charlottesville, the conduct would not fall within the current
federal terrorism law.
Bringing charges specified in the federal crime of terrorism
statute allows the FBI to investigate any individual or group
connected to a given defendant’s activity.51 This helps curtail any

42

Id.; see Holly Yan, Texas Attack: What We Know About Elton Simpson and
Nadir Soofi, CNN (May 5, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/05/us/texas-shootinggunmen/index.html.
43
Mark Washburn & Tim Funk, Man in Charlotte Accused of Recruiting for
Islamic State, Planning Training Compound, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 4, 2016),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article93679667.html.
44
Id.
45
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i).
46
Id.
47
New York Truck Attack Suspect ‘Spent a Year Planning’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41835266.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i).
51
See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23.
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future threats posed by people connected to the defendant. These
charges also are eligible for a sentencing enhancement52 and
carry a greater societal significance than other charges.
C. Acts Ineligible for the Federal Crime of Terrorism
Not all federal crimes can constitute the federal crime of
terrorism, even if the defendant intended to intimidate or coerce
a civilian population or the government.53 There is no doubt that
the American public and the government want to deter acts of
this nature.54 Law enforcement acknowledges that crimes of this
nature are a danger to the American public,55 and the
government has mechanisms in place for addressing such
threats.56 However, many violent acts by domestic extremists do
not trigger the more extensive measures that exist within the
federal terrorism framework to deter crimes of terrorism and
allow for more effective investigations.57
The statutory
framework needs to be amended to ensure that violent acts by
domestic extremists can be adjudicated within it, thus triggering
antiterrorism investigatory procedures when necessary.
Under the current statutory framework, a defendant with a
long history of participation in domestic hate groups was not
eligible for a charge specified in the federal crime of terrorism
statute when he shot and killed three individuals based on his
anti-Semitic views.58 On April 13, 2014, Frazier Glenn Cross, Jr.,
also known as Frazier Glenn Miller, killed two people at a Jewish
community center and another woman in the parking lot of a
52

See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9, at § 3A1.4.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i).
54
See Letter from U.S. Senate, to Elaine Duke, Acting Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. (Aug. 18, 2017), available at https://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/081817%20Letter%20to%20Acting%20Secretary%20Duke.pdf; S.J. Res.
49, 105th Cong. (2017).
55
Charles Kurzman & David Schanzer, Law Enforcement Assessment of the
Violent Extremism Threat, TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SEC. 3
(June 25, 2015), https://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2013/06/Kurzman_Schanzer_Law_
Enforcement_Assessment_of_the_Violent_Extremist_Threat_final.pdf.
56
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM (2016)
57
See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23;
18 U.S.C. § 3286(b) (2012) (noting that there is no statute of limitations if a federal
crime of terrorism results in death); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(j) (West 2015) (noting that
there is also no limitation on supervised release period following the conviction of a
federal crime of terrorism).
58
Second Amended Complaint, State v. Cross, No. 14CR853 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Oct.
17, 2014).
53
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nearby Jewish retirement home in Overland Park, Kansas.59
Cross had a history of white supremacist views and was
described as a “pioneer[] in the modern hate world.”60 Cross
targeted these individuals because of their presence at the
community center, for he claimed that he wanted to prevent “a
genocide by Jews.”61 Although Cross intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population, his slaying of three people did not
constitute terrorism because he chose to use a gun instead of a
bomb.62 Instead, Cross was convicted of capital murder,63 which
made him eligible for the death penalty, but did not trigger the
legal mechanisms that accompany a terrorism-related charge.64
If Cross were charged with a crime specified in the federal crime
of terrorism statute, the FBI would have easily been able to
investigate any existing ties to hate groups, including the
structure of those groups, and the likelihood of further violence
by members of those groups.65
The need for statutory amendment also was illustrated when
a defendant that targeted a health clinic based on his political or
religious views similarly fell outside of the federal crime of
terrorism. On November 27, 2015, Robert Lewis Dear, Jr. killed
three people and injured nine more at a Planned Parenthood
clinic in Colorado Springs, Colorado.66 The defendant was found
to be a supporter of a group known as the Army of God, which
“has claimed responsibility for a number of killings and
bombings.”67 Dear was said to have developed his hatred for
abortion based on his “religious views.”68 However, before Dear
59

Id.
Ed Payne, Frazier Glenn Cross ‘Entrenched in the Hate World’, CNN (Aug. 31,
2015), https://www.cnn.com/2014/04/14/us/kansas-shooting-suspect-profile/index.
html.
61
Jury To Begin Penalty Phase of Frazier Glenn Cross Trial Tuesday, KMBC
NEWS (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.kmbc.com/article/jury-to-begin-penalty-phase-offrazier-glenn-cross-trial-tuesday/3690250.
62
Id.
63
Id. Capital murder is not a crime specifically enumerated under
18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) (West 2015).
64
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23.
65
Id.
66
See Sadie Gurman, Suspect in Colorado Clinic Attack Will Face Murder
Charges, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/
article47206975.html.
67
Richard Fausset, For Robert Dear, Religion and Rage Before Planned
Parenthood Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/
us/robert-dear-planned-parenthood-shooting.html.
68
Id.
60
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was deemed mentally incompetent to stand trial, he was charged
only with first degree murder, so the investigative and
retributive mechanisms accompanied by a federal terrorism
charge did not apply to Dear.69 If the FBI charged Dear with a
federal crime of terrorism, it could further investigate his
connections to the Army of God, including any attacks that the
group may be planning.
Finally, a defendant self-radicalized by white supremacist
propaganda who killed nine people based on their race yet did
not come within the federal terrorism framework is another
example of why the framework needs to be changed. On June 17,
2015, Dylann Roof killed nine people and injured another at
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston,
South Carolina.70
Roof intentionally targeted the historic
African-American church due to his white supremacist beliefs
and motivation to start a “race war.”71 Although some would
argue that Roof committed an act of terrorism, he was found
guilty on federal hate crime charges.72 Even though Roof was
described as “self-radicalized,” and government officials said that
his actions were “consistent with the concept of leaderless
resistance and martyrdom advocated by white supremacy
extremist groups and self-radicalization leading to violence,”73 he
was not eligible for a charge under the current federal crime of
terrorism statute.
The legal mechanisms established by the terrorism
framework should be activated when the defendant intends to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population or the government. The
inquiry should not hinge on the weapon used or the target
chosen. Each of these acts should fall within the federal
terrorism framework.
This would not only initiate legal
mechanisms, but it would also achieve much of what Congress

69

Gurman, supra note 66; see SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9,
at § 3A1.4.
70
Ray Sanchez & Ed Payne, Charleston Church Shooting: Who is Dylann Roof?,
CNN (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/us/charleston-church-shooting
-suspect/index.html.
71
Id.
72
See generally Jesse J. Norris, Why Dylann Roof is a Terrorist under Federal
Law, and Why It Matters, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259 (2017).
73
Associated Press, Church Shooting Suspect Dylann Roof Was ‘SelfRadicalized,’ Authorities Say, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/nationnow/la-na-dylann-roof-church-shooter-20160823-snap-story.html#.

2018]

ADDRESSING DOMESTIC EXTREMISM

403

sought in the Joint Resolution by signaling to law enforcement
and the public that domestic extremists are a considerable threat
to public safety that should not be viewed in isolation.
II. CURRENT FEDERAL LAW DOES NOT APPRECIATE THE THREAT
POSED BY DOMESTIC EXTREMISM
This section explores the threat of domestic extremists
operating within the United States. For the purposes of this
Note, extremist ideologies are broken down into three groups:
Islamic extremism, far-left extremism, and far-right extremism.
The University of Maryland Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Reponses to Terrorism (“START”) defines Islamic
extremists generally as “those who profess[] some form of belief
in or allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), alQa’ida, or other (radical) Islamist-associated terrorist entities.”74
START defines leftist extremists as those holding “extremist
environmental beliefs, extremist ‘animal liberation’ beliefs, or
extremist far left beliefs.”75 Further, right-wing extremism is
defined as “that which is motivated by a variety of far right
ideologies and beliefs, generally favoring social hierarchy and
seeking an idealized future favoring a particular group” including
“white supremacists and antigovernment militias.”76 The federal
government focuses heavily on the threat posed by Islamic
extremists.
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, Islamic extremism
continues to be the primary focus of foreign policy and counterterrorism efforts.77 Due to the prevalence of foreign terrorist
organizations, the actions of Islamic extremists have an
inherently transnational nature that brings them within the
statutory framework.78 There is no doubt that the threat posed
74
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-300, COUNTERING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM: ACTIONS NEEDED TO DEFINE STRATEGY AND ASSESS PROGRESS OF
FEDERAL EFFORTS 29 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf.
75
Id. at 28.
76
Id. at 1.
77
See Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations to Defeat ISIS, U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/OIR/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2018). The United
States and its allies have conducted 24,566 airstrikes in its effort to defeat ISIS. Id.
Former FBI Director James Comey told Congress that there are “about a thousand
open investigations on” Islamic State-related extremism. Charles Kurzman, MuslimAmerican Involvement with Violent Extremism, 2016, TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM
AND HOMELAND SEC. 3 (January 26, 2017), https://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2018/
01/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Involvement_with_Violent_Extremism_2017.pdf.
78
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b (West 2015).
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by Islamic extremists must be taken very seriously; however,
that does not mean that these groups and individuals should be
the sole concentration of counterterrorism efforts.
Domestic extremists present a threat that is comparable to,
if not greater than, the Islamic extremist groups that seem to
dominate the rhetoric surrounding terrorism. Between 2000 and
2011, violence from far-right groups increased by 400 percent.79
During the period following September 11th, Islamic extremists
have killed only seven more individuals than right-wing
extremists.80 In fact, since September 12, 2001, right-wing
extremist groups have accounted for seventy-three percent of
“violent extremist incidents that resulted in death.”81 According
to the United States Extremist Crime Database, there were no
attacks since 1990 by persons associated with extreme leftist
ideologies that resulted in fatalities to non-perpetrators;82
however, left-wing extremists are still present in the United
States and said to “engage in crimes such as vandalism, theft,
the destruction of property, and arson.”83
A.

Violence by Domestic Extremists Is Often Charged as a Hate
Crime

It is not illegal to be a member of one of these extremist
groups,84 and a law that attempted to criminalize such
membership would be unconstitutional.85 Therefore, there is no
statute outlawing material support for a domestic terrorist
group.86 In fact, the federal government does not designate or
establish official lists of domestic terrorist groups.87 This does
79
Arie Perliger, Challenges from the Sidelines: Understanding America’s Violent
Far-Right, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. 87 (November 2012), https://ctc.usma.edu/
app/uploads/2013/01/ChallengersFromtheSidelines.pdf.
80
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 74, at 5. The report notes that
“41 percent of the deaths attributable to radical Islamist violent extremists
occurred” during the Orlando night club shooting. Id.
81
Id. at 4.
82
Id.
83
JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42536, THE DOMESTIC
THREAT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 11 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
terror/R42536.pdf. This Note regularly references right-wing extremists, but the
suggested changes to the terrorism framework would apply to left-wing extremists
as well.
84
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992); United States v.
Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 928 (11th Cir. 1995).
85
Stewart, 65 F.3d at 928.
86
BJELOPERA, supra note 83, at 9.
87
Id.
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not mean that members of these groups cannot commit acts of
terrorism; it simply means that a member of one of these groups
must commit an act or conspire to commit an act specifically
codified in the federal crime of terrorism statute in order to be
legally deemed a terrorist.88 If a white supremacist shoots nine
people because of his belief that minorities are inferior, he likely
will be charged with a hate crime.89
A hate crime occurs when an individual “attempts to cause
bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, . . . national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person.”90 This
broad statute can sometimes encompass activity that many
would view as terrorism.91 In fact, former Attorney General
Loretta Lynch described hate crimes as “the original terrorism.”92
The Dylann Roof case is not the only instance in which a
perceived terrorist act was ultimately charged as a hate crime.
In 2011, a white supremacist named Kevin Harpham
attempted to bomb a parade honoring Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.93 The FBI initially referred to the incident as an act of
domestic terrorism, but the bureau later shifted the rhetoric
when Harpham ultimately “pled guilty to committing a federal
hate crime and attempting to use a weapon of mass
destruction.”94 It is unclear why the government did not pursue a
sentencing enhancement under § 3A1.4 when attempting to use a
weapon of mass destruction is an act specifically codified as a
federal crime of terrorism.95
Perhaps Harpham’s alleged
membership in “the neo-Nazi National Alliance,” contact with a
“leader of a white supremacist group,” and “postings on white
supremacist websites” made it easier to pursue a charge under
the hate crime statute, instead of a terrorism enhancement.96 It
is hard to imagine that a Muslim defendant would have been
charged with a hate crime under similar circumstances.
88

See United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 517 (6th Cir. 2001).
See Norris, supra note 72, at 266–67.
90
18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012).
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Norris, supra note 72, at 267 (quoting Kevin Johnson, Attorney General
Lynch: ‘Hate Crimes Are the Original Domestic Terrorism’, USA TODAY (June 24,
2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/06/24/loretta-lynch-baptistchurch-birmingham/29238615/).
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B. A Hate Crime Charge Is Inadequate in Some Cases
A hate crime conviction brings forth a significant increase in
sentencing,97 but designating an act of terrorism as a hate crime
does not send the same message or activate the same
investigatory mechanisms.98 Former Attorney General Loretta
Lynch acknowledged that a hate crime charge “may give the
impression that the government ‘[does]n’t consider those crimes
as serious.’ ”99 It is important for the public to appreciate the
seriousness and threat posed by extremists who are willing to
commit hate crimes. Perpetrators of hate crimes are often
viewed as acting entirely on their own,100 but this ignores the
systematic underground that exists to influence and recruit
domestic extremists.101 Federal agencies have acknowledged the
systematic threat presented by domestic extremist groups.102
Congress has called for these groups to be included within the
framework and discussion regarding terrorism.103 Adding hate
crimes to the list of acts specified in the federal crime of
terrorism statute will trigger investigative procedures by the FBI
that allow the government to analyze how the defendant was
radicalized, whether the radicalization is connected to any group
or individual, and the potential for future harm posed by those
groups or individuals.104 If a person who commits a hate crime
can be radicalized in a similar way and commit a similar act, the
designation given to that act should be no different. Current
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18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012).
See Norris, supra note 72, at 267.
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Id. (quoting Timothy M. Phelps, Dylann Roof Indicted on Federal Hate-Crime
Charges in Charleston Church Shooting, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-roof-hate-crimes-20150722-story.html)
(alteration in original).
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Center Shootings Reveal New Dangers of ‘Lone Wolves’, NBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014),
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federal law categorizes terrorism based on the methods used to
carry out the killings or the target chosen, leaving out some
violent acts by domestic extremists, while some state laws
categorize terrorism based on the intention of the defendant to
intimidate the civilian population or the government, which
allows for a more comprehensive definition of terrorism.105
III. STATE TERRORISM LAWS INCLUDE MURDER AS A
SPECIFIC ACT
This section examines state laws that include murder as a
specific act that may constitute terrorism. Adding murder as a
specifically enumerated act allows wholly domestic extremists to
be included within the terrorism framework without requiring a
specific method or target as the pivotal factor. The inquiry
focuses on the intent of the defendant who committed the act.
Conversely, adding murder to the federal crime of terrorism
statute will not indiscriminately expand the definition. Only
murders that are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population or a unit of government will constitute terrorism.
Thus, the amendment will not bring common crime within the
terrorism framework.
A.

If Murder Constitutes an Act of Terrorism, Then Acts of
Domestic Extremists Will Be More Adequately Addressed

The District of Columbia’s (“D.C.”) terrorism statute includes
murder and manslaughter as specific acts that may constitute
terrorism, which allows law enforcement to charge domestic
extremists with terrorism instead of being prevented from doing
so by the method used or target chosen by the defendant. The
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 (“D.C. statute”) is structured
similarly to federal law, for the D.C. statute specifies certain acts
that are eligible for the terrorism definition, but the D.C. statute
includes murder and manslaughter as specific acts that may
constitute a crime of terrorism.106 The act must also be intended
to “[i]ntimidate or coerce a significant portion of the civilian
population . . . ; or [i]nfluence the policy or conduct of a unit of
government.”107
105

18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b (West 2015).
D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3152(8) (West 2001). The statute was a response to the
attacks on September 11th in which state and local governments felt that they
needed their own legislation to confront terrorism. Id.
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The D.C. statute allows the inquiry to focus on the
defendant’s intent without the charge hinging on whether his or
her actions were specifically enumerated in the statute. In
August 2012, Floyd Lee Corkins opened fire on an unarmed
security guard at the Family Research Council.108 Corkins pled
guilty to terrorism charges and signed a statement saying that
he “targeted the Family Research Council because of its views,
including its advocacy against recognition of gay marriage.”109
The United States Attorney assigned to the case stated that
“[t]oday’s guilty plea makes clear that using violence to terrorize
political opponents will not be tolerated.”110 The Corkins case
shows that an attempted murder intended to send a political
message is an example of terrorism under these statutes.
A similar case likely would not be eligible for a charge that
falls within the federal crime of terrorism. Corkins did not target
a unit of government, use a weapon of mass destruction, or have
a connection to a foreign entity.111 The nexus to terrorism was
established because Corkins’ actions were an attempt to coerce a
civilian population or a unit of government.112 A conviction under
the D.C. statute allows for up to thirty years in prison, which
brings forth strong condemnation of acts that are intended to
intimidate or coerce civilians or the government.113
There may be some concerns that the D.C. statute
encompasses too much activity, which will dilute the crime of
terrorism and encompass protected activity. Congress does not
want to indiscriminately expand the definition of terrorism to
include activity that it should not.114 It is unclear if the D.C.
statute would encompass such activity, but case law shows that
New York’s similar terrorism statute does not encompass
ordinary criminal behavior.
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B. Murder in the Definition of Terrorism Does Not
Indiscriminately Expand the Designation
New York State’s terrorism law allows murder to be
prosecuted as a crime of terrorism without encompassing
common crimes such as gang violence. New York Penal Law
§ 490 (“New York statute”) defines the crime of terrorism as
“murder, assassination or kidnapping” done “with intent to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of
a unit of government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the
conduct of a unit of government.”115
The law was designed to condemn large terror attacks, but it
was also created to address and prosecute events like the 1994
murder on the Brooklyn Bridge.116 In that case, a gunman who
attcked a van transporting young Jewish students across the
Brooklyn Bridge was thought to be acting in retaliation for a
recent attack on Muslims by a Brooklyn-born Jewish man in the
West Bank.117 The shooting was viewed as an act of terrorism by
many,118 and the New York Supreme Court alluded to the
shooting as a means for extending the meaning of the New York
statute to include “acts of a much smaller scale” than the
September 11 attacks.119
However, the New York statute does not extend to more
common criminal acts such as gang violence. The New York
Court of Appeals has found that charging a gang member under
the terrorism statute was inappropriate because the defendant
did not intend to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.120
Although the court stated that “residents of a single apartment
building to a neighborhood, city, county, state or even a country”
could constitute a civilian population, the term could not apply
when the “objective [was] to intimidate or coerce other Mexican-

115

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05 (McKinney 2018). The federal terrorism legislation
is mentioned in the text of the code, but the legislature felt that “[a] comprehensive
state law is urgently needed.” Id. § 490.00 (McKinney 2018).
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People v. Ferhani, No. 2461/11, 37 Misc. 3d 1232(A), 2012 WL 6554892, at *2
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. June 25, 2012).
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People v. Morales, 20 N.Y.3d 240, 247, 982 N.E.2d 580, 584–85, 958 N.Y.S.2d
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American gangs.”121 This decision was based on the idea that the
terrorism statute was not intended to reach “ ‘street crime’ and
‘ordinary violent crime.’ ”122 The New York statute includes
murder but does not indiscriminately extend the definition of
terrorism to include every violent felony.123
The New York statute effectively reaches crime that should
be categorized as terrorism. The wording of the statute allows
the inquiry to focus on the intent of the defendant.124 Congress
limited the federal statute to specific acts in fear that the
definition of terrorism would be used indiscriminately,125 but the
New York case law shows that expanding the actions that may
constitute a crime of terrorism will not improperly encompass
common criminal acts such as gang activity.126 Congress should
expand the federal definition in order to allow the federal crime
of terrorism to focus on the intent of the defendant because state
laws cannot adequately address national security concerns.
IV. THE FEDERAL CRIME OF TERRORISM STATUE NEEDS TO BE
CHANGED
This section suggests changing the intent requirement as
well as adding both murder and hate crimes to the list of offenses
under the current federal crime of terrorism.
State law
enforcement cannot adequately address the threat posed by
domestic extremists.
Although state laws may encompass
extremist activity in ways that the federal code does not, state
laws do not trigger the same investigatory mechanisms or send
the same message.127 Federal agencies engage in information
sharing and have investigatory powers that cross borders and
allow for more cohesive and effective enforcement. In addition,
federal law often signals to states and citizens that a given policy
is important and should be recognized broadly.
The federal statute should allow the inquiry to focus on the
intent of the defendant in determining whether the act
constitutes a crime of terrorism; adding murder and hate crimes
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would allow this to be the case. The federal terrorism statutes
need to target acts of violence intended to coerce or intimidate a
civilian population or the government without an arbitrary
distinction that leaves some mass murders being designated as
terrorism while some are not even considered eligible for the
designation.128
A.

Categorization of Terrorism Should be Based on Intent, Not
Target or Method

Categorizing an act as domestic terrorism should not hinge
on whether the behavior or attempted action was in furtherance
of one of the specific crimes listed in the statute.129 The inquiry
should focus on whether or not the group or individual intended
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or unit of
government. Congress has reasons to deter the targeting of
systems of transportation and government buildings, which the
law will continue to do; however, the current manifestation of the
statute leaves other vital institutions unprotected. Targeting of
schools is not listed in the federal crime of terrorism, nor are
churches or places of public performances such as theaters.130
The current categorization of terrorism focuses on a list of
facilities that were brainstormed at the time of drafting. The
same can be said for the methods specified in the statute.
Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons can bring forth a
catastrophic event, but the two most deadly terrorist attacks on
United States soil since September 11, 2001 were carried out
using means not listed under the federal crime of terrorism and
that took place at locations not specifically listed in the statute.131
The crime of terrorism should be an act intended “to intimidate
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or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a unit of
government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a
unit of government” no matter what means are used.132
B. Intent To Intimidate or Coerce a Civilian Population Should
Be Included Within the Federal Crime of Terrorism
The definition of both international terrorism and domestic
terrorism include acts intended “to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population.”133 This shows that terrorism does not necessarily
have to target the government. The federal crime of terrorism
statute does not currently apply to acts that are intended to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population.134 However, district
courts are authorized to apply the domestic terrorism sentencing
enhancement if the defendant commits a specified offense with
the intent “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, rather
than to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government
conduct.”135 The federal crime of terrorism should not be limited
to acts against the government. Limiting the definition of the
federal crime of terrorism to government targets creates
confusion and incongruent definitions within the code.
C. Including Murder in the Statute Will Shift the Inquiry to
Focus on Intent
Amending the statute to include murder as a specific act that
may constitute the federal crime of terrorism to allow the inquiry
to focus on whether or not the act was carried out with the
intention to coerce or intimidate a civilian population or the
government will eliminate the confusion associated with
categorizing crimes as terrorism, and allow counterterrorism
measures to be applied more thoroughly to domestic extremist
groups. This amendment would not target any group based on
beliefs nor would it unreasonably expand the scope of the
definition.

132
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Adding murder as a specific act that may constitute the
federal crime of terrorism allows the categorization of terrorism
to hinge on the intent of the defendant. As seen under the D.C.
terrorism statute, if an individual or group attacks innocent
people in order to further his or her ideology, including murder
as an offense will catch everything that truly falls within the
definition.136 This includes the leftist extremists in D.C. as well
as the right-wing extremist in Charlottesville.137
This
amendment should not bring forth concern that the definition of
terrorism will be unreasonably expanded either.
The amendment will bring forth a more comprehensive
definition of terrorism that does not leave the country debating
over whether or not an act constitutes terrorism.138 The inquiry
will focus on the intent of the defendant and not include acts that
should not fall within the definition. As seen under the New
York statute, violence that is not intended to achieve one of the
two specific outcomes associated with terrorism will not fall
within the definition.139 Although gang activity and other
senseless forms of violence are problems that need to be
addressed, this amendment will not confer the label of domestic
terrorism to every murder. Terrorism should not become a
phrase that is used “indiscriminately.”140 Notably, Professor
Jesse J. Norris also suggested that murder should be included in
the definition of terrorism in order to expand its application.141
Although Norris offers respectable, intelligent changes to
domestic terrorism law, if Congress changes the inquiry to
whether the defendant had “the intent to advance, publicize or
express an ideology” the courts will be left with more questions
regarding what constitutes terrorism.142
The definition of
terrorism should focus on whether the defendant intended to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population or unit of
government.143 This is a standard that courts are familiar with
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and apply today. It is also important to specify certain acts as
federal crimes of terrorism in order to signal that certain entities
and institutions need to be protected.
Furthermore, it is
important for law enforcement to strongly monitor the purchase,
sale, and development of explosives specified in the statute.
Norris is right to say that murder needs to be included within the
terrorism framework in order to “encompass an even larger
proportion of terrorists,” but the changes suggested in this Note
allow the existing framework to remain intact while
accomplishing a similar goal.144 The current federal crime of
terrorism reaches domestic acts, but adding murder as a
specified act will bring forth a more evenhanded application of
the framework.
The term “terrorism” is disproportionately associated with
Muslims, and Muslim communities feel the impact of that
association.145 This has led to an egregious assumption that
Islam is a religion filled with terrorists.146 Federal law should
never apply disproportionately to any sect of the population
whether it be based on religion, ideology, or race. Members of
Congress, federal agencies, and local law enforcement have
acknowledged the risk presented by domestic extremists,147 but
including murder specifically within the definition of the federal
crime of terrorism will allow the threat to be addressed.
Focusing the categorization of terrorism on the intent of the
actor may be difficult because intent is hard to prove; however,
the current statute already requires the intent to be present for
an act to be considered a federal crime of terrorism.148 The
current statute limits the application to certain acts specified in
the statute, but commission of the act does not automatically
categorize the act as a federal crime of terrorism.149 Under the
144
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suggested changes, murder will be added to the list so that, when
carried out or attempted with the intent to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population or the government, it will be eligible for the
terrorism designation. The intent requirement works as a
safeguard to ensure this designation is not expanded
indiscriminately.150
D. Adding Hate Crimes to the Statute Will More Adequately
Cover Extremist Activity
Adding hate crimes as a specific act listed in the federal
crime of terrorism statute will allow more acts perpetrated by
domestic extremists to be categorized as terrorism and reinforce
the notion that hate crimes are taken seriously by the federal
government without eroding the need for hate crime statutes or
indiscriminately expanding the federal terrorism framework.
Hate crime statutes are an important part of the United States
federal and state penal laws. These statutes send a strong
message that crimes motivated by bigotry will not be tolerated.151
As discussed earlier, many violent acts by political extremists
may constitute hate crimes because extremist violence often
targets a specific group.152 Currently, the only groups whose
conduct is adequately addressed by the terrorism framework are
Islamic or anti-government extremists.153
Adding hate crimes as a specific act listed in the federal
crime of terrorism statute will bring racial, religious, and genderbased violence within the terrorism framework when the
requisite intent is also present. This will allow for greater
information sharing and investigations throughout the law
enforcement community. Currently, a hate crime can only be
considered a federal crime of terrorism if it is carried out with a
weapon of mass destruction or carried out at a particular
facility.154 This is inadequate because hate crimes that are
150
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intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or the
government can be carried out in a wide range of ways not listed
in the statute. When this intent is present, a hate crime should
be considered terrorism under federal law.
Placing hate crimes within the framework of terrorism will
reinforce the idea that hate crimes are offenses that are equally
as serious as terrorism. As mentioned above, former Attorney
General Loretta Lynch called hate crimes the “original terrorism”
but acknowledged that a hate crime charge “may give the
impression that the government ‘[does]n’t consider those crimes
as serious.’ ”155 This impression is likely derived from the idea
that “ ‘terrorism’ is a phrase that carries far-reaching
connotations,”156 so when the Department of Justice seeks a hate
crime conviction as opposed to a terrorist conviction, the public
perceives the crime differently.157 Hate crimes should be viewed
as incredibly serious offenses, especially when they are carried
out with the intent required to be considered federal crimes of
terrorism.
Not all hate crimes will be considered acts of terrorism if
these changes are implemented. A hate crime can be carried out
against an individual with no intent to target a population as a
whole. The act will not be considered a federal crime of terrorism
if this intent is lacking. There will still be a need for a robust
hate crime statute that addresses and deters isolated incidents
that do not reach the level of terrorism.
Adding hate crimes as a specific act listed in the federal
crime of terrorism statute will not indiscriminately expand the
federal terrorism framework either. As mentioned, the terrorism
categorization will only be given when the requisite intent is
found.158 Furthermore, hate crimes only prohibit willfully caused
bodily harm.159 This “does not include solely emotional or
psychological harm to the victim,”160 nor does it encompass
thoughts, beliefs, or speech by the defendant.161 Placing hate
crimes within the framework will only encompass willful bodily
harm that includes the intent required under both the hate crime
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See supra note 99.
See Buckman, supra note 114.
See supra note 99.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b.
Glenn v. Holder, 690 F.3d 417, 421–22 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 421 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 249(c)(1) (2012)).
Id. at 421–22 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 16 (2009)).
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statute as well as the federal crime of terrorism statute, so there
is no concern that this will impede constitutionally protected
activity.
E. Outlawing Material Support for Domestic Terror Groups
Would be Unconstitutional
Outlawing material support for a domestic terror group
would be unconstitutional. The federal government does not
designate or publicly list domestic terrorist organizations.162 The
federal government designates foreign terrorist organizations
and that is the basis for the material support statute.163 This
statute makes it illegal to provide financial aid or recruit on
behalf of groups such as al-Qaeda.164 Even though creating a
material support for domestic terror statute would likely be an
effective measure for preventing violence,165 such a statute would
likely be unconstitutional.166 It is not illegal to hold extremist
beliefs or join most extremist groups due to First Amendment
protections.167 It is, of course, illegal to plan or act violently
based on those beliefs,168 but that conduct does not need a
material support statute to be reached. Therefore, a material
support statute for domestic terrorism may be effective, but it
likely would be unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Federal terrorism law does not adequately address the
threat posed by domestic extremists. The current law creates
arbitrary lines that exclude some acts and include others without
a focus on the intent of the defendant. Amending the specific
acts that constitute the federal crime of terrorism to include
murder and hate crimes will sufficiently broaden the framework
to reach domestic extremist groups without diluting the
designation of terrorism or unconstitutionally limiting freedom of
association. Adding the intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian
162
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population to the definition of the federal crime of terrorism will
bring more congruence to the interpretation of the code as well as
its enforcement. Congress has called for the Executive Branch to
target domestic extremists, but the legislature has the power to
enact changes that will truly allow the threats to be addressed.
These changes will also bring a more cohesive definition of
terrorism and ease the misperceptions regarding Islam. The
current federal law surrounding terrorism creates confusion, onesided enforcement, and does not allow law enforcement to
adequately address domestic extremist groups. Congress must
make these simple changes for the safety and security of the
American public.

